Abstract-Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permit to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors. Combining these two properties proved difficult: it is impossible to contain the spatial impact of Byzantine nodes in a self-stabilizing context for global tasks such as tree orientation and tree construction. We present and illustrate a new concept of Byzantine containment in stabilization. Our property, called Strong Stabilization enables to contain the impact of Byzantine nodes if they actually perform too many Byzantine actions. We derive impossibility results for strong stabilization and present strongly stabilizing protocols for tree orientation and tree construction that are optimal with respect to the number of Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated in a self-stabilizing context.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [3] , [5] , [14] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults, while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [9] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is appealing yet proved difficult [6] , [2] , [12] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Two main paths have been followed to study the impact of Byzantine faults in the context of self-stabilization. The first one is Byzantine fault masking. In completely connected synchronous systems, one of the most studied problems in the context of self-stabilization with Byzantine faults is that of clock synchronization. In [1] , [6] , probabilistic self-stabilizing protocols were proposed for up to one third of Byzantine processors, while in [4] , [8] deterministic solutions tolerate up to one fourth and one third of Byzantine processors, respectively. The second one is Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e., tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was proposed [12] , [13] , [11] . Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside which the effect of permanent faults is masked. In [12] , the authors show that this Byzantine containment scheme is possible only for local tasks. As many problems are not local, it turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those.
Our contribution. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of Byzantine containment in a self-stabilizing setting for tasks that are global (i.e., for with there exists a causality chain of size r, where r depends on n the size of the network), and focus on two global problems, namely tree orientation and tree construction. As strict stabilization is impossible with such global tasks, we weaken the containment constraint by limiting the number of times that correct processes can be disturbed by Byzantine ones. Recall that strict stabilization requires that processes beyond the containment radius eventually achieve their desired behavior and are never disturbed by Byzantine processes afterward. We relax this requirement in the following sense: we allow these correct processes beyond the containment radius to be disturbed by Byzantine processes, but only a limited number of times, even if Byzantine nodes take an infinite number of actions.
The main contribution of this paper is to present new possibility results for containing the influence of unbounded Byzantine behaviors. In more details, we define the notion of strong stabilization as the novel form of the containment and introduce disruption times to quantify the quality of the containment. The notion of strong stabilization is weaker than the strict stabilization but is stronger than the classical notion of self-stabilization (i.e., every strongly stabilizing protocol is self-stabilizing, but not necessarily strictly stabilizing). While strict stabilization aims at tolerating an unbounded number of Byzantine processes, we explicitly refer the number of Byzantine processes to be tolerated. A self-stabilizing protocol is ðt; c; fÞ-strongly stabilizing if the subsystem consisting of processes more than c hops away from any Byzantine process is disturbed at most t times in a distributed system with at most f Byzantine processes. Here, c denotes the containment radius and t denotes the disruption time.
To demonstrate the possibility and effectiveness of our notion of strong stabilization, we consider tree construction and tree orientation. It is shown in [12] that there exists no strictly stabilizing protocol with a constant containment radius for these problems. The impossibility result can be extended even when the number of Byzantine processes is upper bounded (by one). In this paper, we provide a ðfÁ d ; 0; fÞ-strongly stabilizing protocol for rooted tree construction, provided that correct processes remain connected, where n (respectively, f) is the number of processes (respectively, Byzantine processes) and d is the diameter of the subsystem consisting of all correct processes. The containment radius of 0 is obviously optimal. We show that the problem of tree orientation has no constant bound for the containment radius in a tree with two Byzantine processes even when we allow processes beyond the containment radius to be disturbed a finite number of times. Then, we consider the case of a single Byzantine process and present a ðÁ; 0; 1Þ-strongly stabilizing protocol for tree orientation, where Á is the maximum degree of processes. The containment radius of 0 is also optimal. Notice that each process does not need to know the number f of Byzantine processes and that f can be n À 1 at the worst case. In other words, the algorithm is adaptive in the sense that the disruption times depend on the actual number of Byzantine processes. Both algorithms are also optimal with respect to the number of tolerated Byzantine nodes.
Due to space limitations, this paper contains only the formal definition of strong stabilization and a short presentation of results related to tree construction. The interested reader could find in the associated supplementary file, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/ 10.1109/TPDS.2011.158, 1) a discussion on relationship between strong stabilization and pseudo stabilization (Section 1), 2) complete proofs and time complexities of the tree construction (Section 2), and 3) the complete study of tree orientation (Section 3).
PRELIMINARIES
Distributed System
A distributed system S ¼ ðP ; LÞ consists of a set P ¼ fv 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v n g of processes and a set L of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct processes. A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is P and whose link set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S.
Processes u and v are called neighbors if ðu; vÞ 2 L. The set of neighbors of a process v is denoted by N v , and its cardinality (the degree of v) is denoted by Á v ð¼ jN v jÞ. The degree Á of a distributed system S ¼ ðP ; LÞ is defined as Á ¼ maxfÁ v j v 2 P g. We do not assume existence of a unique identifier for each process (that is, the system is anonymous). Instead, we assume each process can distinguish its neighbors from each other by locally arranging them in some arbitrary order: the kth neighbor of a process v is denoted by N v ðkÞ ð1 k Á v Þ.
Processes can communicate with their neighbors through link registers. For each pair of neighboring processes u and v, there are two link registers r u;v and r v;u . Message transmission from u to v is realized as follows: u writes a message to link register r u;v and then v reads it from r u;v . The link register r u;v is called an output register of u and is called an input register of v. The set of all output (respectively, input) registers of u is denoted by Out u (respectively, In u ), i.e., Out u ¼ fr u;v j v 2 N u g and In u ¼ fr v;u jv 2 N u g.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. Similarly, the values of the variables stored in each link register denote the state of the registers. A process may take actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an atomic manner by the process. The actions executed by each process is described by a finite set of guarded actions of the form hguardi À! hstatementi. Each guard of process u is a Boolean expression involving the variables of u and its input registers. Each statement of process u is an update of its state and its output/input registers.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product of states of all processes and all link registers. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed system S. For a process set R P and two configurations and 0 , we denote 7 ! R 0 when changes to 0 by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that and 0 can be different only in the states of processes in R and the states of their output registers. For completeness of execution semantics, we should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The action of a process depends only on its state at and the states of its input registers at , and the result of the action reflects on the states of the process and its output registers at 0 . A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q ¼ R 1 ; R 2 ; . . . be a schedule, where R i P holds for each i ði ! 1Þ. An infinite sequence of configurations e ¼ 0 ; 1 ; . . . is called an execution from an initial configuration 0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies iÀ1 7 ! R i i for each i ði ! 1Þ. Process actions are executed atomically, and we also assume that a distributed daemon schedules the actions of processes, i.e., any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions.
The set of all possible executions from 0 2 C is denoted by E 0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by E, that is, E ¼ S 2C E . We consider asynchronous distributed systems where we can make no assumption on schedules except that any schedule is weakly fair: every process is contained in infinite number of subsets appearing in any schedule.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e., a Byzantine-faulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine process, v can repeatedly change its variables and its output registers arbitrarily.
In asynchronous distributed systems, time is usually measured by asynchronous rounds (simply called rounds). Let e ¼ 0 ; 1 ; . . . be an execution by a schedule Q ¼ R 1 ; R 2 ; . . . The first round of e is defined to be the minimum prefix of e, e 0 ¼ 0 ; 1 ; . . . ; k , such that S k i¼1 R i ¼ P 0 where P 0 is the set of correct processes of P . Round t ðt ! 2Þ is defined recursively, by applying the above definition of the first round to e 00 ¼ k ; kþ1 ; . . . Intuitively, every correct process has a chance to update its state in every round.
Self-Stabilizing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e., they require the system to find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem, while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification predicate (shortly, specification), specðvÞ, for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with a solution) if every process satisfies specðvÞ. A specification specðvÞ is a Boolean expression on variables of P v ð P Þ where P v is the set of processes whose variables appear in specðvÞ. The variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables). In what follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification specðvÞ.
A self-stabilizing protocol is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration, where specðvÞ holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a legitimate configuration, every process v never changes its O-variables and always satisfies specðvÞ. From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process correctly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently faulty processes.
When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy specðvÞ. In addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to satisfy specðvÞ. Nesterenko and Arora [12] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a selfstabilizing protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows:
Definition 1 (c-correct process). A process is c-correct if it is correct (i.e., not Byzantine) and located at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
Definition 2 ((c,f)-containment).
A configuration is ðc; fÞ-contained for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from , every c-correct process v always satisfies spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [12] . The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [12] dealt with unbounded number of Byzantine faults (that is, f 2 f0 . . . ng).
Definition 3 ((c,f)-strict stabilization).
A protocol is ðc; fÞ-strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e ¼ 0 ; 1 ; . . . contains a configuration i , that is, ðc; fÞ-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [12] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. Intuitively, a specification is rrestrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For some problems, such as the spanning tree construction we consider in this paper, r cannot be bounded to a constant. We can show that there exists no ðoðnÞ; 1Þ-strictly stabilizing protocol for the spanning tree construction.
To circumvent the impossibility result, we define a weaker notion than the strict stabilization. Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e., there may exist processes outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered action is limited in times: the set of Byzantine processes may only impact the subsystem consisting of processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
From the states of c-correct processes, c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations are defined as follows:
Definition 4 (c-legitimate configuration). A configuration is c-legitimate for spec if every c-correct process v satisfies spec(v).
Definition 5 (c-stable configuration).
A configuration is cstable if every c-correct process never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed system eventually reaches a clegitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a selfstabilizing system can be disturbed by Byzantine processes after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The c-disruption represents the period where c-correct processes are disturbed by Byzantine processes and is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (c-disruption). A portion of execution e ¼ 0 ; 1 ; . . . ; t (t > 1) is a c-disruption if and only if the following holds:
1. e is finite, 2. e contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable, 3. 0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable, and 4. t is the first configuration after 0 such that t is clegitimate for spec and c-stable. Now, we can define a self-stabilizing protocol such that Byzantine processes may only impact the subsystem consisting of processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
Definition 7 ((t,k,c,f)-time contained configuration).
A configuration 0 is ðt; k; c; fÞ-time contained for spec if given at most f Byzantine processes, the following properties are satisfied:
1. 0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable, 2. every execution starting from 0 contains a clegitimate configuration for spec after which the values of all the O-variables of c-correct processes remain unchanged (even when Byzantine processes make actions repeatedly and forever), 3. every execution starting from 0 contains at most tcdisruptions, and 4. every execution starting from 0 contains at most k actions of changing the values of O-variables for each c-correct process.
Definition 8 ((t,c,f)-strongly stabilizing protocol).
A protocol A is ðt; c; fÞ-strongly stabilizing if and only if starting from any arbitrary configuration, every execution involving at most f Byzantine processes contains a ðt; k; c; fÞ-time contained configuration that is reached after at most l rounds. Parameters l and k are, respectively, the ðt; c; fÞ-stabilization time and the ðt; c; fÞ-process-disruption time of A.
Note that a ðt; k; c; fÞ-time contained configuration is a ðc; fÞ-contained configuration when t ¼ k ¼ 0, and thus, ðt; k; c; fÞ-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of a ðc; fÞ-contained configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing protocol is weaker than a strictly stabilizing one (as processes outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to Byzantine influence). However, a strongly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing one (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameters t, k, and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each process to know the values of the parameters. Actually, the protocols proposed in this paper assume no knowledge on the parameters.
STRONGLY-STABILIZING SPANNING TREE CONSTRUCTION 3.1 Problem Definition
In this section, we consider only distributed systems in which a given process r is distinguished as the root of the tree. For spanning tree construction, each process v has an Ovariable prnt v to designate a neighbor as its parent. Since processes have no identifiers, prnt v actually stores kð2 f1; 2; . . . ; Á v gÞ to designate its kth neighbor as its parent. No neighbor is designated as the parent of v when prnt v ¼ 0 holds. For simplicity, we use prnt v ¼ k ð2 f1; 2; . . . ; Á v g) and prnt v ¼ u (where u is the kth neighbor of v 2 N v ðkÞ) interchangeably, and prnt v ¼ 0 and prnt v ¼ ? interchangeably.
The goal of spanning tree construction is to set prnt v of every process v to form a rooted spanning tree, where prnt r ¼ 0 should hold for the root process r.
We consider Byzantine processes that can behave arbitrarily. The faulty processes can behave as if they were any internal processes of the spanning tree, or even as if they were the root processes. The first restriction we make on Byzantine processes is that we assume the root process r can start from an arbitrary state, but behaves correctly according to a protocol. Another restriction on Byzantine processes is that we assume that all the correct processes form a connected subsystem; Byzantine processes never partition the system. It is impossible, for example, to distinguish the (real) root r from the faulty processes behaving as the root, we have to allow that a spanning forest (consisting of multiple trees) is constructed, where each tree is rooted with a root, correct or faulty one.
We define the specification predicate specðvÞ of the tree construction as follows: specðvÞ is the predicate ðprnt v ¼ 0Þ^ðlevel v ¼ 0Þ if v is the root r and ðprnt v 2 f1; . . . ;
Notice that specðvÞ requires that a spanning tree is constructed at any 0-legitimate configuration, when no Byzantine process exists. Fig. 1 shows an example of 0-legitimate configuration with Byzantine processes. The arrow attached to each process points the neighbor designated as its parent.
Protocol ss-ST
In many self-stabilizing tree construction protocols (see the survey of [7] ), each process checks locally the consistence of its level variable with respect to the one of its neighbors. When it detects an inconsistency, it changes its prnt variable in order to choose a "better" neighbor. The notion of "better" neighbor is based on the global desired property on the tree (e.g., shortest path tree, minimum spanning tree. . . ).
When the system may contain Byzantine processes, they may disturb their neighbors by providing alternatively "better" and "worse" states. The key idea of protocol ss-ST to circumvent this kind of perturbation is the following: when a correct process detects a local inconsistency, it does not choose a "better" neighbor but it chooses another neighbor according to a round robin order (along the set of its neighbor). Fig. 2 presents our strongly stabilizing spanning tree construction protocol ss-ST that can tolerate any number of Byzantine processes other than the root process (providing that the subset of correct processes remains connected). These assumptions are necessary since a Byzantine root or a set of Byzantine processes that disconnects the set of correct processes may disturb all the tree infinitely often. Then, it is impossible to provide a ðt; k; fÞ-strongly stabilizing protocol for any finite integer t.
The protocol is composed of three rules. Only the root can execute the first one (GA0). This rule sets the root in a legitimate state if it is not the case. Nonroot processes may execute the two other rules (GA1 and GA2). The rule GA1 is executed when the state of a process is not legitimate. Its execution leads the process to choose a new parent and to compute its local state in function of this new parent. The last rule (GA2) is enabled when a process is in a legitimate state but there exists an inconsistence between its variables and its shared registers. The execution of this rule leads the process to compute the consistent values for all its shared registers.
Proof of Strong Stabilization of ss-ST
In this section, we provide a sketch of the proof of the strong stabilization of ss-ST .
We cannot make any assumption on the initial values of register variables. But, we can observe that if an output register of a correct process has inconsistent values with the process variables, then this process is enabled by a rule of ss-ST . By fairness assumption, any such process takes a step in a finite time.
Once a correct process v executes one of its action, variables of its output registers have values consistent with the process variables: r-prnt v;prntv ¼ true, r-prnt v;w ¼ false ðw 2 N v À fprnt v gÞ, and r-level v;w ¼ level v ðw 2 N v Þ hold.
Consequently, we can assume in the following that all the variables of output registers of every correct process have consistent values with the process variables.
We denote by LC the following set of configurations:
We interest now on properties of configurations of LC. We can observe that any configuration of LC is 0-legitimate and that any correct process is not enabled in such a configuration. We can deduce Lemma 1. Any configuration of LC is 0-legitimate and 0-stable.
We can observe that there exists some 0-legitimate configurations which not belong to LC (for example, the one of Fig. 2) .
To prove the convergence of ss-ST to LC starting from any configuration, we prove that any execution reaches a configuration in which every correct process is disabled. We show that the root r executes its rule at most once. Then, any of its correct neighbor v executes its rule at most Á v before pointing to r. After that, v is never enabled. By repeating the reasoning, we obtain Lemma 2. Given at most n À 1 Byzantine processes, for any initial configuration 0 and any execution e ¼ 0 ; 1 ; . . . starting from 0 , there exists a configuration i such that i 2 LC.
It remains to prove that any execution starting from an arbitrary configuration of LC contains only a finite number of 0-disruptions. First, we prove by induction on the distance between the root and a correct process v in the subgraph of correct processes that v executes its action at most Á times. We say that a Byzantine process b deceives a correct neighbor v in the step 7 ! 0 if the state of b makes the guard of an action of v true in and if v executes this action in this step. As a 0-disruption can be caused only by an action of a Byzantine process from a legitimate configuration, we can bound the number of 0-disruptions by counting the total number of times that correct processes are deceived of neighboring Byzantine processes. If a 0-correct v is deceived by a Byzantine neighbor b, it takes necessarily Á v actions before being deceiving again by b (recall that we use a round-robin policy for prnt v ). As any 0-correct process v takes at most Á d actions in any execution, v can be deceived by a given Byzantine neighbor at most Á dÀ1 times. A Byzantine process can have at most Á neighboring correct processes and thus can deceive correct processes at most Á Â Á dÀ1 ¼ Á d times. We have at most f Byzantine processes, so the total number of times that correct processes are deceived by neighboring Byzantine processes is fÁ d . Hence, the number of 0-disruption in e is bounded by fÁ D . Now, assume by contradiction that there exists an infinite 0-disruption d ¼ i ; . . . in e. This implies that for all j ! i, j is not in LC, which contradicts Lemma 2. Then, we can state Hence, the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Strong-stabilization). Protocol ss-ST is a ðfÁ d ; 0; fÞ-strong stabilizing protocol for the spanning tree construction, where f is the number of Byzantine processes and d is the diameter of the subsystem consisting of all the correct processes.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We introduced the notion of strong stabilization, a property that permits self-stabilizing protocols to contain Byzantine behaviors for tasks where strict stabilization is impossible. In strong stabilization, only the first Byzantine actions that are performed by a Byzantine process may disturb the system. If the Byzantine node does not execute Byzantine actions, but only correct actions, its existence remains unnoticed by the correct processes. So, by behaving properly, the Byzantine node may have the system disturbed arbitrarily far in the execution. By contrast, if the Byzantine node executes many Byzantine actions at the beginning of the execution, there exists a time after which those Byzantine actions have no impact on the system. As a result, the faster an attacker spends its Byzantine actions, the faster the system become resilient to subsequent Byzantine actions. An interesting trade-off appears: the more actually Byzantine actions are performed, the faster the stabilization of our protocols is (since the number of steps performed by correct processes in response to Byzantine disruption is independent from the number of Byzantine actions). Our work raises several important open questions.
First, is there a trade-off between the number of perturbations Byzantine nodes can cause and the containment radius ? In this paper, we strove to obtain optimal containment radius in strong stabilization, but it is likely that some problems do not allow strong stabilization with containment radius 0. It is then important to characterize the difference in containment radius when the task to be solved is "harder" than, e.g., tree construction.
Second, is there a trade-off between the total number of perturbations Byzantine nodes can cause and the number of Byzantine nodes, that is, is a single Byzantine node more effective to harm the system than a team of Byzantine nodes, considering the same total number of Byzantine actions ? A first step in this direction was recently taken by Yamauch et al. [15] , where Byzantine actions are assumed to be upper bounded, for the (global) problem of leader election. Their result hints that only Byzantine actions are relevant, independently of the number of processes that perform them. It is, thus, interesting to see if the result still holds in the case of potentially infinite number of Byzantine actions.
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